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DISCOUNT FOR LACK OF 
MARKETABILITY:
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
B y  R o n a ld  D . D iM a t t ia ,  C P A , A B V , CM A
OVERVIEW
Some leading practitioner-authors 
have questioned whether a discount 
for lack of marketability should be 
applied when valuing controlling 
ownership interests. Although the 
logical argum ents are strong that 
controlling ownership interests lack 
marketability, no empirical studies 
have been cited as support—unlike 
m inority ownership interests, for 
which such studies are numerous.
This article analyzes the concept of 
m arketability  generally and as it 
applies to contro lling  ownership 
interests. It then identifies an area of 
academic research, merger arbitrage, 
which has been widely examined and 
includes a number of empirical stud­
ies. The conceptual underpinnings of 
merger arbitrage are described and 
are found to be quite similar to the 
lack of marketability concept for con­
trolling ownership interests. Empiri­
cal evidence from certain studies is 
then cited and offered as an indicator 
of the lack of marketability for con­
trolling ownership interests. Areas for 
further research are also identified.
GENERAL THEORY
The concept of a discount for lack of 
marketability in valuing privately held
business ownership interests is well 
established in modern valuation the­
ory. It can be a crucial aspect in the 
valuation of the stock of a privately 
held company because many valuation 
methods used by appraisers result in a 
marketable indication of value. That 
result is due to the underlying market 
data that appraisers use in the income 
and market approaches. These data 
are derived from publicly traded com­
panies. It is generally accepted that 
appraisers should consider whether 
the interest being valued is nonmar­
ketable, and if a discount for lack of 
marketability should be applied.
The concept of marketability cen­
ters on the ease with which the 
holder of a stock ownership interest 
can convert the security to cash in 
terms of timing, the reliability of real­
izing the quoted proceeds, and trans­
action costs. The authors of Valuing a 
Business put it better, as follows:
In this text, we will define mar­
ketability as the ability to convert 
the business ownership interest (at 
whatever ownership level) to cash 
quickly, with minimum transaction 
and adm inistrative costs in so 
doing and with a high degree of 
certainty of realizing the expected 
amount of net proceeds.1
1 Shannon Pratt, Robert F. Reilly, and Robert P. Schweihs, Valuing a Business, 4th ed (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2000), p. 393.
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The general standard  against 
which marketability is measured is 
stocks that are actively traded on pub­
lic exchanges. When the owners of a 
stock are unable to quickly liquidate 
their ownership position, they are 
exposed to significantly greater risk 
than stockholders of a company 
traded on a public exchange. The 
owners of an illiquid security cannot 
react quickly to developments in the 
specific company they have an invest­
ment in, or to developments in the 
broader market. Studies have shown 
that, because investors are risk averse, 
they apply a considerable discount to 
stocks that are not freely tradable.
It is widely accepted that m ar­
ketability is affected by a variety of 
factors including the com pany’s 
num ber of shareholders, financial 
stability and volatility of earnings, 
concentration of ownership inter­
ests, capabilities of management, size 
of the block of stock being valued, 
required holding period, restrictions 
on transfers, size of the company, 
and dividend-distribution policy. 
The Court ruling in Bernard Mandel­
baum, et al v. Commissioner (TCM 
1995-255) provides an excellent 
analysis of the discrete factors affect­
ing the marketability of a minority 
ownership interest.
Much of the work that valuation 
practitioners conduct involves mea­
suring the fair m arket value of a 
minority ownership interest in a pri­
vately held company. So it is no sur­
prise that the empirical studies of
m arketability  have focused on 
minority ownership interests. The 
most widely used studies can be 
divided into two general categories:
1. Studies of discounts on sales of 
restric ted  shares of publicly 
traded companies
2. Studies of discounts on sales of 
closely held shares relative to the 
subsequent initial public offering 
price per share.
Both groups of studies contain a 
thorough body of research which 
consistently suggests a general range 
of discount from 20%-60% to reflect 
a minority equity interest’s lack of 
marketability in a privately held com­
pany, with a rough average being 
30%-45%.
It is also widely accepted among 
valuation practitioners that m ar­
ketability has a fairly close relation­
ship with the level of ownership con­
trol. It is generally assumed that the 
higher the level of control, the lower 
the level of marketability discount 
(all else held constant), as illustrated
There is disagreem ent among 
practitioners, however, regarding 
the lack of marketability associated 
with co n tro llin g  in te rests . Put 
ano ther way, some practitioners 
believe that the line in the preced­
ing graph should intersect zero at 
some poin t along the ownership 
continuum . Some leading practi­
tioner-authors state that no empiri­
cal evidence supports the claim that 
controlling  interests in privately 
held companies lack marketability, 
and that if any lack of marketability 
does exist, it is cap tu red  in the 
calculated valuation result.2 Some 
practitioners do believe that the 
lack of m arketability is reflected 
in the  valuation  resu lt w hen a 
m erger and acquisition valuation 
method is utilized under the mar­
ket approach. Well-known authors, 
however, seem to agree that a dis­
count for lack of marketability is 
re q u ire d  with the m erg er and 
acquisition method.3
It would seem that most practi­
tioners believe that despite the lack 
of empirical evidence, it is only log­
ical that a controlling interest in a 
privately held company would be 
illiquid, regardless of the level of 
ow nership  in te re s t, even 100% 
ownership. The illiquidity related 
to a co n tro llin g  in te re s t would 
derive principally from the factors 
described in the following para­
graphs based on the discussion of 
them by Pratt, Reilly, and Schweihs 
in Valuing a Business, 4th edition.4
2  James R. Hitchner, Financial Valuation: Applications and Models, 2nd edition (New Jersey: Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2006), pp. 391-392 (summarizing the controversy).
3  Shannon P. Pratt, The Market Approach to Valuing Businesses, (New Jersey: Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2000), 154-155, and Hitchner, pp. 268-269.
4 Shannon Pratt, Robert F. Reilly, and Robert P. Schweihs, Valuing a Business, 4th ed (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), pp. 411-416.
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• Time horizon risk. The rule of 
thumb among investment bankers 
and business brokers is that it can 
take, on average, 9-12 months to 
sell a small, privately held com­
pany. The process includes draft­
ing marketing materials, identify­
ing potential buyers, contacting 
buyers, holding preliminary discus­
sions, negotiating letters of intent, 
conducting due diligence proce­
dures including appraisals and 
EPA reports, negotiating the for­
mal purchase agreement, and clos­
ing the transaction.
— Offsetting time horizon risk 
would be the in terim  cash 
flows an investor could expect 
as a result of the company’s 
dividend or distribution policy.
• Price risk (a). There are two ele­
ments to price risk. The first risk 
is actually realizing the quoted 
proceeds. Estimates of value for 
privately held enterprises can vary 
widely, and for some enterprises, 
there  is a serious question 
whether they can be sold at all. 
Business brokers and investment 
bankers seem to believe that for 
any given transaction there is a 
very small probability of success. 
Business brokerage industry arti­
cles note that only one in five 
companies that are listed for sale 
is actually sold, and that 50% of 
deals that make it to the letter of 
intent stage fail.5
• Price risk (b). The second element 
of risk is the form that the pur­
chase price will take. Considera­
tion paid for a privately held 
enterprise is rarely all cash and 
often includes risky contingent 
consideration. Transaction cur­
rencies (cash vs. seller notes vs. 
earn-outs) would seem to exhibit 
a cyclical nature, varying in pro­
portion depending on the health
of the overall financial markets.
Both risks d iffer dram atically 
from that associated with the sale 
of publicly traded entities.
— To the extent a valuation ana­
lyst considers price risk effects 
in a valuation (by reducing the 
value conclusion or stating it as 
a range), it would not be nec­
essary to include such consid­
erations in estimating a dis­
count for lack of marketability. 
The difficulty is that price risk 
effects are driven as much by 
the characteristics of buyers 
generally and the economic 
outlook  as they are by the 
attributes of the valuation sub­
ject. As a result it may be more 
effective to consider price risk 
within the context of a dis­
count for lack of marketability 
than to consider it separately.
• Transaction costs. Many valuation 
practitioners believe that transac­
tion costs should not be taken into 
account in determining the value 
of an ownership interest. However, 
it is the relative difference in trans­
action costs, compared to a rele­
vant base, which concerns valua­
tion analysts because costs have an 
im pact on proceeds. Costs for 
attorneys, accountants, investment 
bankers, and environmental con­
sultants and o ther fees and 
expenses can be quite high (10% 
or more) for a small privately held 
company. It would seem that the 
concept of “economies of scale” 
would apply to acquisitions of own­
ership interests as well. Valuation 
analysts generally consider the 
effect of transaction costs when a 
significant relative difference in 
costs is expected.
Although the logical arguments in 
support of a discount for lack of mar­
ketability for controlling interests are
strong, no empirical data have been 
cited to date in support of it as there 
is with minority ownership interests.6 
Many practitioners assume that the 
level of marketability discount should 
be lower with controlling interests 
than with m inority  in terests (as 
depicted in the chart accompanying 
this article), and generally settle on a 
discount of 20% or less.7 It is the 
absence of empirical evidence that 
lies at the heart of the ongoing 
debate about discounts for lack of 
marketability for controlling interests 
in privately held companies.
MERGER ARBITRAGE-EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE
The concept of merger arbitrage has 
been established in the financial 
community for decades and can be 
defined as it is in the following para­
graph taken from a Working Paper, 
“Merger Arbitrage: Evidence of Prof­
itability” by Taewon Yang and Ben 
Branch8:
Merger arbitrage specialists invest 
in com panies involved in a 
merger or an acquisition. In an 
acquisition situation, the manager 
will usually go long the stock of 
the company being acquired and 
short the stock of the acquiring 
company. The stock of the com­
pany being acquired will in gen­
eral trade at a discount since all 
acquisitions take time and there 
always is a risk that the acquisition 
will not be completed. Merger 
arbitrage funds make investment 
profits when they successfully 
an tic ipate  the outcom e of an 
announced merger and capture 
the spread between the current 
m arket price and the price at 
which the stock will be trading 
after the merger is completed.
So once a merger or acquisition
of a publicly traded  com pany is 
announced, the target’s stock price
5 “Why Your Business Won’t Sell!” Article ID: 116; “Tips on Avoiding the Deal Breakers,” Article ID: 35 by Business Brokers Press, available online at California Association 
of Business Brokers (www.cabb.org).
6 Hitchner, p. 377; Exhibit 8.2; p. 392.
7 Ibid., p. 392.
8 University of Massachusetts, Isenberg School of Management Working Paper, pp. 1-2 (airtdatabase.com/research/pdffiles/article2taiwonandbranch.pdf).
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reacts and tends to rise near to, but 
generally lower than, the announced 
acquisition price. There seems to be 
general agreement that the differen­
tial in price arises because there is a 
meaningful lapse between the time 
the deal is first announced and when 
it eventually closes, as described in 
the following excerpt from another 
working paper, “Expanding the Lim­
its of Merger Arbitrage” by Eliezer 
Fich and Irina Stefanescu:9
Because the purchase and tender 
of target shares do not occur simul­
taneously, risk arises in at least two 
different ways. First, while the deal 
is still pending, there is a risk that it 
will fail. In this situation the target’s 
price will likely fall, and the arbi­
trageur will suffer substantial losses. 
Second, arbitrageurs may require 
capital to finance the purchase of 
target shares while the deal is pend­
ing. Thus, even if the merger is 
completed, financing may put prof­
its at risk....
An announced merger or acquisi­
tion could fail as a result of a variety 
of issues including the following:
• The target’s performance could 
slip, causing the buyer to re-evalu­
ate the price or the entire deal.
• The buyer’s performance could 
change, m aking it unlikely to 
close the deal.
• G eneral econom ic conditions 
could change, such as unantici­
pated movements in interest rates 
that make deal financing unat­
tractive.
• Dynamics within either the buyer’s 
or target’s industries could change, 
such as a strike against or bank­
ruptcy of a major supplier.
• Financial markets could experi­
ence a shock, a recent and vivid 
example being the “subprim e” 
debacle.
• Regulators could rule that the 
deal is anticompetitive and cause
the terms to be altered or force it 
into a lengthy litigation.
— Such regulations apply to even 
relatively small transactions as 
a resu lt of the Hart-Scott- 
Rodino A ntitrust Im prove­
ments Act of 1976.
• Unexpected information about a 
target could come to light causing 
the buyer to reconsider.
The linkage between studies of 
merger arbitrage and an analysis of 
discounts for lack of marketability 
for controlling ownership interests is 
compelling. The similarities between 
these public m erger transactions 
(for which there is substantial avail­
able data) and private acquisitions of 
controlling interests (for which there 
is very little  available data) are 
strong. They are as follows:
• Both represent the acquisition of 
a controlling ownership interest.
• Both require a substantial period 
of time to complete.
• As a result of the lengthy time to 
complete, both are subject to a 
meaningful level of deal failure for 
which investors seek protection.
ELAPSED TIME
As noted previously the ability to liq­
uidate a position in a stock quickly is 
a key determinant of marketability. A 
recent paper by Ben Branch and 
Taewon Yang studied 185 “collar” 
merger offers from 1993-2003.10 The 
authors found that the average dura­
tion of public collar merger offers 
was 139 days. The working paper by 
Eliezer Fich and Irina Stefanescu 
cited earlier, “Expanding the Limits 
of Merger Arbitrage,”11 studied 1,928 
cash and stock mergers and acquisi­
tions from 1985-2000 and found that 
the average transaction duration was 
about 4.5 months (although table 1 
of that paper lists the average dura­
tion as 94 days, or about 3 months).
As we stated earlier, the rule of 
thumb among business brokers and 
investment bankers is that the sale of 
a privately held company requires a 
significantly longer period of time 
than the period cited in the studies 
previously mentioned. The rule of 
thumb period is between 9 and 12 
months, sometimes longer than a 
year, depending on market condi­
tions. However, it is unclear at this 
point whether private transactions 
do, in fact, take longer to consum­
m ate—from beginning  to end— 
than do public transactions. Before a 
public m erger or acquisition  is 
announced, a significant amount of 
due diligence has already occurred, 
which is facilitated by Securities and 
Exchange Commission disclosure 
requ irem en ts. So although  the 
elapsed time from announcement to 
closing approximates 4.5 months for 
public transactions, it is quite possi­
ble that the time from initial explo­
ration of a merger or sale to closing 
approximates the rule of thumb for 
privately held companies. It would 
appear that the oft-cited business 
brokers’ rule of thumb starts when 
the broker is first hired, prior to 
preparing the initial due diligence 
package and contacting buyers.12 
From the perspective of elapsed 
time, it would appear that public 
m ergers and acquisitions could 
exhibit similar characteristics to pri­
vate mergers and acquisitions, but 
further research is required to con­
firm this belief.
TRANSACTION FAILURE RISK
Merger arbitrage studies also provide 
insights regarding another element 
of marketability—certainty of realiz­
ing the quoted proceeds. Because of 
the lengthy period of time necessary 
to close a merger/acquisition, there 
are a num ber of reasons why the 
transaction m ight ultim ately fall 
apart. Data regarding the potential
9 Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Working Paper, May 18, 2003, p. 5. (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=410600)
10 “Merger Deal Structures and Investment Strategies,” The Journal of Alternative Investments, Winter 2006, Exhibit 4.
11 Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Working Paper, May 18, 2003, p. 12.
12 “How Long Does it Take?” Business Brokerage Press (www.bbpinc.com/articlesdetail.asp?id=27).
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for an announced transaction to fail 
are also well-documented.
In their working paper, “Expand­
ing the Limits of Merger Arbitrage,” 
Eliezer Fich and Irina Stefanescu 
found that nearly 23% of the deals in 
their study failed .13 Additionally, 
Micah Officer studied 4,593 merger 
or tender offer bids over the period 
1985-2004 and found that between 
l7%-22% of the transactions in his 
study failed.14
Given the research, transaction 
failu re  risk is no t insignificant. 
In teresting ly , the Fich and Ste­
fanescu paper also found that the 
risk of deal failure was significantly 
higher for smaller acquirers, de­
fined as those not included in the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 index. They 
found that roughly 9% of transac­
tions failed when the bidder was 
part of the S&P 500. However, the 
failure rate jumps to 26% when the 
b id d e r  is n o t in c lu d ed  in the 
index.15 Because the acquirer of a 
smaller privately held company is 
more likely to be outside the S&P 
500 index, one could argue that the 
risk of deal fa ilu re  is p robab ly  
greater the smaller the target.
The Mergerstat Review (Mergerstat) 
is a well regarded publication among 
valuation analysts. It includes informa­
tion about deal failure rates. At first 
blush it would appear that Merger­
stat’s data contradict the findings in 
the previously mentioned research 
papers. The Mergerstat data are sum­
marized in the following table:16
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Gross
announcements 7,469 8,136 9,924 10,522 10,841
Cancellations 166 153 141 171 182
Cancellations % 2% 2% 1% 2% 2%
Mergerstat presents data in its year­
book back to 1982, and cancellations 
generally approximate less than 10%
each year. Over the past 10 years 
cancellations were generally less 
than 4%. Other detail in the Merger­
stat yearbook, though, provides use­
ful insights.17
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Gross
announcements 7,469 8,136 9,924 10,522 10,841
Cancellations 166 153 141 171 182
Cancellations % 2% 2% 1% 2% 2%
Publicly
traded sellers 411 463 372 448 488
Privately 
owned sellers 3,683 3,714 4,916 5,385 5,744
Divestitures 2,691 3,188 3,560 3,570 3,375
The differences in cancellation
results would appear to be explained 
by the nature of the data sets used in 
each case. The academic research of 
merger arbitrage is focused on trans­
actions involving publicly traded sell­
ers. Mergerstat’s data are dominated 
by privately owned sellers and divesti­
tures. Additionally, Mergerstat’s data 
are obtained principally through 
public announcem ents of transac­
tions. This fact is important because 
privately owned sellers (and to some 
extent divestitures) are not subject to 
the same disclosure requirements as 
are publicly traded sellers. To be 
sure, deals with privately owned sell­
ers do fail, but those failures are far 
less likely to be announced publicly. 
Announcements of transactions with 
private sellers (and many divesti­
tures) are generally published once 
the deal is completed, not while it is 
pending , unlike publicly traded  
sales. It is well known and widely 
accepted that with privately owned 
sellers and divestitures, the principals 
involved are very reluctant to have 
any information about a pending 
transaction “leaked” before it is actu­
ally completed. The reasons most 
often cited relate to employees (who 
could leave if they know the com­
pany’s being sold), customers (who
could get concerned about their 
source of supply), and competitors 
(who could try to use the announce­
ment to their advantage). Although 
further research is necessary to rec­
oncile these differences, it would not 
appear that the academic research of 
merger arbitrage overstates transac­
tion failure risk.
RISK DISCOUNT
Empirical research makes clear that 
for publicly traded targets, the time 
between deal announcem ent and 
consummation is lengthy, and the 
risk of deal failure is high. So it is logi­
cal that arbitrageurs should reap a 
benefit for assuming this risk in the 
form of a discount from the 
announced deal price. In terms of the 
merger arbitrage market, this dis­
count is known as the spread, and 
empirical studies support its existence 
and indicate that it is meaningful.
The study by Ben Branch and 
Taewon Yang of collar merger offers 
found that the spread between the 
offer price and the market price one 
day after the merger announcement 
averaged roughly 9% for the transac­
tions in their study.18 Micah Officer’s 
study analyzed the spread from sev­
eral perspectives with average spread 
results ranging from 4%-6% gener­
ally.19 However, these studies are 
silent on the effect that dividends 
have on the calculated spread, an 
interesting question that should be 
researched further.
It is important to note the differ­
ences in the way each of the studies 
mentioned in the previous paragraph 
calculates the spread. The Branch/ 
Yang study calculates the initial 
spread, which is the spread one day 
after the merger announcement. The 
study by Micah Officer captures the 
average spread for a large num ber
13 Fich and Stefanescu, p. 17.
14 Micah Officer, “Are Performance Based Arbitrage Effects Detectable? Evidence From Merger Arbitrage” Working Paper, February 20, 2007, p. 15. 
(http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=725322)
15 Fich and Stefanescu, p. 17.
16 Mergerstat Review 2007 Yearbook, FactSet Mergerstat LLC, p. 158.
1 7  Ibid. pp. 158,219.
18 Ben Branch and Taewon Yang, “Merger Deal Structures and Investment Strategies,” The Journal of Alternative Investments, Winter 2006, Exhibit 6.
19 Officer, Tables 4 & 5, Figure 1.
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of transactions that are pending 
around large failed mergers (the 
purpose of his study was to determine 
if average spreads are affected by the 
failure of large high profile proposed 
mergers). So, in the study by Micah 
Officer, the spreads calculated could 
span a wide time range after the 
announcement of a merger. As Offi­
cer notes in his working paper
M erger spreads differ between 
deals and across time due to deal- 
specific characteristics. For exam­
ple, the probability that a merger 
proposal or tender offer will be 
successfully consumm ated and 
the probability that a higher com­
peting bid will eventuate are both 
factors that will cause spreads to 
vary....Intuitively, spreads should 
be narrower, but positive, when 
the offer is more likely to be com­
pleted and completed in a short 
timeframe because arbitrageurs 
are m ore likely to realize the 
offered compensation for their 
shares quickly.20
The distinction in calculation 
methods is important because one 
would expect that the initial spread 
should become narrower as a trans­
action nears com pletion. That is 
because the probability of deal failure 
is expected to be greatest when the 
transaction is first announced. As a 
deal nears completion, risk of failure 
should begin to subside, and the 
spread should narrow. There are 
notable exceptions to this expecta­
tion, and further research would be 
useful to confirm this belief. But it 
would seem fair to say that the study 
method used by Micah Officer would 
tend to produce lower spread results 
than the m ethod used in the 
Branch/Yang study. Further research 
is required to confirm this belief.
A dditionally, Micah O fficer’s 
study indicates the existence of a size 
effect re la ted  to the sp read .21 
Although the spread on the largest
targets in one part of his study 
ranged from 1%-3%, the spread for 
the smallest targets approximated 
7%. This finding is significant as it 
relates to discounts for lack of mar­
ketability because many valuation 
practitioners assume that the smaller 
the company, the less marketable it 
is (all else being constan t). The 
results of Officer’s study would seem 
to support this conclusion.
APPLICATION TO DISCOUNTS FOR LACK OF 
MARKETABILITY OF CONTROLLING 
INTERESTS
Given the similarities between public 
and private merger and acquisition 
transactions, it would seem logical to 
apply the findings from studies of 
merger arbitrage to the valuation of 
a privately held controlling owner­
ship interest for the following rea­
sons:
• The studies cited re la te  to 
announced mergers and acquisi­
tions, which are control indica­
tions of value.
• Empirical research indicates that 
merger announcements are a sign 
of an illiquid valuation as the time 
to realize the quo ted  price is 
ex tended , which is sim ilar in 
acquisitions of privately held com­
panies.
• Empirical research also indicates 
that merger announcements are 
subject to significant risk of fail­
ure, similar to acquisitions of pri­
vately held companies.
• Empirical research would indicate 
that the risk the market attaches 
to such illiquidity is significant, 
from 4%-9% according to the 
studies.
Based on the research reviewed, it 
would appear that merger arbitrage 
studies provide useful em pirical 
research concerning the marketabil­
ity of controlling ownership inter­
ests. The average spread calculated 
in the studies would seem to be an 
appropriate measure to use in the
valuation of a controlling ownership 
interest in a privately held company 
to reflect its lack of marketability. 
Merger arbitrage studies would also 
seem to support the belief that, as 
the level of ownership increases, so 
does relative marketability. Empirical 
research would seem to demonstrate 
that discounts for lack of marketabil­
ity are much larger for minority own­
ership interests (35%-40% on aver­
age) than are discounts related to 
con tro lling  ow nership in terests 
(4% -9%  on average). Finally, 
merger arbitrage studies would seem 
to support the belief that larger com­
panies are more marketable than are 
smaller companies (all else being 
constant).
MORE RESEARCH NEEDED
Empirical research summarized in 
this paper indicates that studies of 
m erger arbitrage could be a rich 
source of data in assessing the dis­
count for lack of marketability associ­
ated with contro lling  ownership 
interests. Further study is required, 
though, before it can be accepted as 
settled theory among practitioners. 
The research cited in this article was 
not specifically generated to address 
the question of discounts for lack of 
marketability for controlling inter­
ests; it was focused on returns that 
are generated in merger arbitrage 
trading strategies. However, results 
of merger arbitrage studies would 
seem to indicate that it is a valid area 
of research concerning the m ar­
ketability of controlling ownership 
interests. X
Ronald D. DiMattia, CPA, ABV, CMA, is pres­
ident of Corporate Value Partners, Inc. in 
Rocky River, Ohio, (440) 333-1910. His firm 
specializes in providing corporate finance 
consulting services to small and midsized 
businesses. The author would like to thank 
Bob Duffy, Jim Alerding, and Bill Moran for 
their helpful comments, with special thanks 
to Kevin Yeanoplos for his consistent friend­
ship and invaluable guidance.
2 0  Officer, pp. 6-7.
21  Officer, Figure 1.
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A BATTLE OF EXPERTS
HOLMAN V. COMMISSIONER
B y  L a n c e  S .  H a l l ,  A S A
The following article appeared in The FMV Valuation Alert, a publication of 
FMV Opinions, Inc. (http://www.fmv.com) and is reprinted with permission.
Over the past decade, the IRS has 
achieved considerable success in Tax 
Court attacking the seemingly ubiq­
uitous family limited partnership 
based upon Section 2036(a). Holman 
v. Commissioner (May 27, 2008) 
departs from the normal Section 
2036(a) script and, instead, attacks 
this securities-holding FLP based on 
Section 2703, with some success.1 23
More importantly, however, the ulti­
mate value of the gifted partnership 
interests hinged upon which valua­
tion expert was better.
BACKGROUND
On November 3, 1999, the Holmans 
formed a family limited partnership 
(“Partnership”). A trust on behalf of 
the children contributed 100 shares 
of Dell Corp. stock, and Mr. and Mrs. 
Holm an collectively con tribu ted  
70,000 shares of Dell Corp. stock. The 
purpose of the partnership was four­
fold: (1) long-term growth, (2) asset 
preservation, (3) asset protection, 
and (4) the children’s education. 
Subsequent gifts to the children were 
made on November 8, 1999, January 
4, 2000, and February 2, 2001.
The Partnership agreement had 
the normal prohibitions against trans­
fer that are typically seen in family lim­
ited partnerships. However, this Part­
nership also had a buy-out clause for 
any prohibited transfer that allowed 
the Partnership to repurchase the 
transferred shares at “its fair market 
value based upon the assignee’s right 
to share in distributions from the 
partnership, as determ ined by an
appraisal performed by an indepen­
dent appraiser....” Moreover, the Part­
nership had the option to pay that 
price at “ten percent (10%) of the 
purchase price at closing and pay the 
balance of the purchase price in five 
equal annual installments...together 
with interest at the Applicable Federal 
Rate....”
COURT'S DECISION
The IRS utilized th ree d ifferen t 
attacks on the Partnership gifts: (1) 
The gifts were actually indirect gifts of 
Dell stock, (2) Section 2703 rendered 
the transfer restrictions invalid, and 
(3) the valuation discounts were 
excessive.
INDIRECT GIFTS
The IRS argued that the Partnership 
formation and November 8, 1999 
gift were in essence a gift of Dell 
stock. The IRS based its argument 
on Shepherd v. Commissioner,2 wherein 
assets were contributed to a partner­
ship and, as a result, the capital 
accounts of all partners, including 
the children, were increased, and on 
Senda v. Commissioner,3 wherein the 
partnership was form ed and gifts 
made on the same day. Shepherd was 
deemed inapplicable because Hol­
man differed in that contributions 
were made to the partnership and 
gifts of partnership interests were 
subsequently made.
In regard to Senda, the Holman 
court noted that the gift was of valid 
partnership interests and that six days 
had passed between the formation
and the gift. As a result, the Holman 
Court stated, “We shall not disregard 
the passage of time and treat the for­
mation and funding of the partner­
ship and the subsequent gifts as 
occurring simultaneously under the 
step transaction doctrine.”
SECTION 2703
Section 2703(a) “...provides that, for 
purposes of the gift tax, the value of 
any property transferred by gift is 
determined without regard to any 
right or restriction...relating to the 
property.” However, under 2703(b), 
2703(a) does not apply if:
1. It is a bona fide business arrange­
ment;
2. It is not a device to transfer such 
property to members of the dece­
dent’s family for less than full and 
adequate consideration in money 
or money’s worth; and
3. Its terms are comparable to similar 
arrangements entered into by per­
sons in an arm’s length transaction. 
The Holman Court concluded,
“We find [the restrictions] do 
not...constitute a bona fide business 
arrangement within the meaning of 
section 2703(b)(1).” Furthermore, if 
the Partnership purchases a trans­
ferred interest at “fair market value” 
under the payment terms, other part­
ners (including the remaining chil­
dren) benefit. Accordingly, the 
restrictions are “a device to transfer 
LP units to the natural objects of 
petitioners’ bounty for less than ade­
quate consideration.” Because of the 
violations of 2703(b)(1) and (2), the 
Holman Court passed on determining 
whether the restrictions were similar 
to other business arrangements.
VALUATION DISCOUNTS
The valuation experts for both the 
IRS and the taxpayer provided reports 
which valued the gifted interests with 
and without consideration of the Part­
nership agreement restrictions. Both
1 130 T.C. No. 12 (Judge Halpern).
2  115 T.C. (2000), affd. 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Circuit 2002).
3 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Circuit 2006).
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parties started with the net asset value 
of the Partnership. In considering dis­
counts for lack of control, both parties 
considered the discounts observed on 
closed-end investment funds. The Hol­
man Court favored the IRS’s expert’s 
“more thoughtful” approach and 
determ ined minority discounts of 
11.32%, 14.24%, and 4.63%, respec­
tively, for each of the gift dates. The 
taxpayer’s expert’s minority discounts 
were 14.4%, 16.3%, and 10% respec­
tively.
In determining the discounts for 
lack of marketability, both experts 
used restricted stock data. However, 
the IRS’s expert argued that, over 
time, restricted stock discounts have 
declined. He observed discounts 
declining after 1990, when Rule 
144A was introduced, expanding the 
pool of qualified buyers, and after 
1997, when the Rule 144 holding 
period was reduced to one year from 
two years. He argued that the 1990 
relaxation of qualified buyer rules 
established a market for restricted 
stock, whereas before there was no 
meaningful market. He also argued 
that the reduction in discounts after 
1997 was re la ted  purely to the 
reduced holding period. Based on 
this argum ent, the IRS’s expert 
claimed that the 12% differential 
between the pre-1991 discounts and 
the 1991 through 1996 discounts 
reflected the discount associated 
with creating a market (or the lack 
thereof). Any additional discount 
was purely related to changes in the 
“holding period and factors unre­
lated to marketability.”
The taxpayer’s expert emphasized 
the lack of any market for the Part­
nership interests versus a limited 
market for restricted stock.
Accordingly, based on the 
restricted stock data, “the discount for 
lack of marketability should be at least 
35%.” [Emphasis added by the 
Court.] The Court interpreted the 
taxpayer’s expert’s position as stating, 
in essence, that the real discount 
should be 100% because there is no
market and that the taxpayer’s expert 
simply and “arbitrarily” stopped 
at 35%.
Again, the Holman Court favored 
the IRS’s expert’s argum ent and 
stated, “We agree with [the IRS’s 
expert] that the holding period com­
ponent of the marketability discount 
is of little, if any, influence here.”
In addition to the novel interpreta­
tion of the restricted stock data, the 
IRS’s expert posited a restructuring 
liquidation. In essence, if a partner 
wanted out, the Partnership could dis­
solve, transfer the Dell stock, pro rata, 
to the exiting partner, and reconsti­
tute the Partnership with the remain­
ing partners. Although this seems to 
depart from the fair market value 
“hypothetical willing buyer/willing 
seller” construct, the Holman Court 
agreed with the IRS’s expert. Despite 
noting that “such a transaction is per­
haps inconsistent with the stated pur­
pose of the partnership,” the Court 
was in agreement that, “[s]o long as 
the partnership’s assets remain highly 
liquid, ... the rem aining partners 
would appear to bear little or no eco­
nomic risk in agreeing to a redemp­
tion, or similar transaction, to accom­
modate a wishing-to-assign partner.”
It comes as no surprise that the 
Holman Court concluded, “.. .we can­
not determine any better estimate of 
an appropriate m arketability dis­
count than [the IRS’s expert’s] 12.5 
percent, and we find accordingly.”
WE DISAGREE
Our disagreement with the Holman 
Court relates solely to the discount 
for lack of marketability. Marketabil­
ity is no t an on and off switch. 
Rather, the issue of marketability is 
an issue of varying degrees of liquid­
ity. Some assets have more liquidity 
than other assets. Rule 144A did not 
create a market for restricted stock. 
In essence, there was a market for 
restricted stock before Rule 144A. 
Rule 144A merely increased the 
num ber of potential buyers, thus 
increasing the liquidity of restricted
stock. Moreover, restricted stock and 
the Partnership interests, after ignor­
ing the restrictions, share one identi­
cal attribute: The restricted stock 
and the Partnership interests can be 
sold at any time in a private place­
ment. The restricted stock and Part­
nership interests have one dissimilar­
ity: After a relatively brief holding 
period, restricted stock can be sold 
in the public marketplace at no dis­
count, while there is no such con­
tractual brief holding period and 
public sale available for the Partner­
ship interest. There is only one possi­
ble accurate conclusion and that, all 
things being equal, is that restricted 
stock of a public company is more 
liquid than private stock. It always is 
and always will be. Surprisingly, the 
Holman Court found otherwise.
In any case, the issue of liquidity or 
marketability for restricted stock can­
not be separated from its holding 
period. They are inextricably interre­
lated.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
For estate planning professionals, two 
lessons emerge from Holman. First, 
opportunities to reduce value by hav­
ing repurchase formulas utilizing pay­
ments over time at the Applicable 
Federal Rate in family limited partner­
ships may be gone. The second lesson 
is even more important: Choose your 
expert wisely. Even with a ludicrous 
claim that marketability is unassoci­
ated with the holding period of 
restricted stock (i.e., restricted stock of 
a public company is less liquid than 
private stock), the IRS won because it 
simply had the better expert.
Don’t count on a split-the-differ­
ence Court. Get it right the first time.
Lance Hall is a managing director and co­
founder of FMV Opinions, inc. with offices in 
New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Irvine, 
Chicago, Dallas, and St. Louis. He heads 
FMV’s estate and gift tax valuation practice. 
He can be contacted at lhall@fmv.com.
© 2008 FMV Opinions, Inc.
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ANALYTICAL STRENGTHS AND 
WEAKNESSES OF THE RELIEF FROM 
ROYALTY METHOD
B y  A s h le y  L. R e i l ly  a n d  R o b e r t  F . R e i l ly ,  C P A / A B V
INTRODUCTION
There are four (and only four) types 
of intellectual property: patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, and trade 
secrets. Intellectual property may be 
subject to valuation, lost profits and 
econom ic damages analysis, and 
intercompany transfer pricing analy­
sis. When there is adequate arm ’s 
length license data available from 
which to extract a market-derived 
royalty rate, the valuation analyst will 
often use the relief from royalty 
method (the RFR method) of intel­
lectual property valuation. The RFR 
method may also be used to estimate 
intellectual property-related eco­
nomic damages and an intercom ­
pany transfer price for intellectual 
property.
This discussion summarizes the 
four types of intellectual property 
and the three types of intellectual 
p roperty  econom ic analysis for 
which the RFR m ethod  may be 
applicable. In particular, this discus­
sion will summarize the analytical 
strengths and weaknesses of the RFR 
m ethod . The valuation analyst 
should consider these analytical 
streng ths and weaknesses when 
using the RFR method for any type 
of intellectual property royalty rate 
analysis.
TYPES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In contrast to the four types of intel­
lectual property, there are numerous 
types of commercial intangible assets. 
Most commercial intangible assets 
naturally come into existence in the 
normal course of operations of indus­
trial or commercial business. Exam­
ples of such commercial intangible 
assets include customer and client
relationships, supplier relationships, 
and employee relationships (in the 
form of an assembled workforce). In 
contrast to general intangible assets, 
intellectual property is created, pro­
tected, commercialized, financed, 
and exchanged under specific federal 
or state statutes.
Patents
A patent is a document that is issued 
by the U. S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO). A paten t grants a 
monopoly to the grantee (called the 
inventor) for a limited time on the 
use and development of an inven­
tion. The following three types of 
patents are granted by the PTO:
Utility patents. There are five cate­
gories of utility patents: (a) a 
process paten t, (b) a m achine 
patent, (c) a manufacture patent, 
(d) a composition of matter patent, 
and (e) an im provem ent of an 
existing idea patent.
Design patents. Design patents 
relate to a nonfunctional part of a 
functional manufactured product 
(for example, a package design). 
Plant patents. Plant patents relate 
to asexually or sexually rep ro ­
ducible plants.
Patents are p ro tec ted  by the 
Patent Act, which is included in Title 
35 of the United States Code (USC) 
at Sections 101-376.
Trademarks
A trademark is a distinctive word, 
phrase, logo, graphic symbol, or 
other device used to identify (and to 
distinguish) a product or service. 
Unlike a patent, a trademark is not 
legally required to be registered. 
However, most trademarks are regis­
tered with the PTO.
The following are the five types of 
trademark-related intangible assets:
1. Trademark. The manufacturer’s 
unique logos or symbols
2. Trade name. The manufacturer’s 
name
3. Service mark. The service pro­
vider’s unique logos or symbols
4. Service name. The service 
provider’s name.
5. Trade dress. A distinctive shape 
or packaging related to a particu­
lar product or service
Trademarks are protected by the 
Lanham Act, which is included in 
T itle 15 of the USC at Sections 
1051-1127.
Copyrights
A copyright gives the owner of a cre­
ative work (called the author) the 
right to keep others from using that 
work without the owner’s permis­
sion. It is noteworthy that the copy­
right applies to the expression of an 
idea, but not to the idea itself. In 
other words, an idea (no matter how 
original) cannot be subject to copy­
right protection.
A creative work (called a work of 
authorship) must meet the following 
three criteria in order for the work 
to qualify for a copyright. The work 
must be
1. Original.
2. Fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression.
3. Produced by an exercise of human 
intellect.
In order to create a copyright, the 
author of the work may either place 
a copyright notice on a published 
work or register the work with the 
U.S. Copyright Office. Copyrights 
are protected by the Copyright Act 
of 1976, which is included in Title 35 
of the USC at Sections 101—376.
The owner of the copyright may 
be an employee. However, when the 
employee prepares a “work for hire,” 
then the owner of the subject copy­
right is the employer corporation. 
The copyright may be on a literary 
work, musical composition, film,
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Exhibit 1. Analytical Strengths of the RFR Method in
Intellectual Property Valuation
1. The royalty rate data are typically market-derived.
a. The data come from actual arm 's length intellectual property license transactions.
b. The data can be independently verified (or challenged) by the valuation analyst.
2. The RFR method valuation analysis is transparent.
a. All of the valuation analysis components are fairly obvious.
b. All of the valuation analyst judgments are fairly obvious.
3. The RFR method valuation analysis is mathematically straightforward.
a. The valuation analysis is relatively easy to explain to other parties.
b. The valuation analysis is relatively easy to replicate by other parties.
4. The RFR valuation methodology is consistent with actual commercial business practices.
a. Business people frequently enter into inbound or outbound intellectual property license agreements.
b. Business people frequently buy and sell intellectual property license agreements.
5. The RFR valuation methodology is consistent with the relevant judicial precedent.
a. The courts are familiar with this intellectual property valuation methodology.
b. The published judicial decisions indicate an acceptable range of intellectual property royalty rates.
6. The RFR valuation method has numerous analytical applications.
a. The RFR m ethod m ay be used for various intellectual property va lu atio n , transfer pricing, and 
economic damages purposes.
b. The RFR method m ay be used for various intellectual property license negotiation and license financing 
structures.
computer software, advertising copy, 
em ployee m anuals and tra in ing  
materials, product or process draw­
ings, product catalogs, and other 
internally generated  commercial 
materials.
Trade Secrets
The owner of commercial informa­
tion that provides a competitive edge 
has a legal right to keep others from 
using such information. A trade secret 
can include any formula, pattern, 
physical device, idea, process, or com­
pilation of information. There are two 
requirements for such process infor­
mation or other commercial informa­
tion to qualify as a trade secret. They 
are as follows:
• It must provide the owner with a 
competitive advantage in the rele­
vant marketplace.
• It must be treated by the owner in 
a way so as to prevent the public 
or com petitors from  learn ing  
about it.
There is no legal registration 
process with respect to trade secrets.
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Trade secrets are typically protected 
by state statutes. Most state trade 
secret statutes have generally adopted 
the provisions of the Federal Uniform 
Trade Secrets Protection Act and the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANALYSES
There are three general types of 
intellectual property royalty rate 
analyses:
1. Valuation of the subject intellec­
tual property
2. Transfer price estimate for the 
subject intellectual property
3 Economic damages to the subject 
intellectual property
Valuation
A valuation analyst may be called on 
to perform a valuation of intellectual 
property for numerous reasons. The 
valuation analyst may begin the valu­
ation engagem ent by asking the 
intellectual property owner/opera- 
tor if a recent valuation of the sub­
ject intellectual property (conducted 
for whatever purpose) already exists.
Some of the m ore comm on p u r­
poses for intellectual property valua­
tions include the following:
• Financial (fair value) accounting 
(for example, for personal finan­
cial statements)
• Federal income, gift, or estate tax­
ation (for example, for a charita­
ble contribution)
• Sale or license transactions (for 
example, for intellectual property 
sales or licenses)
• Financing collateral (for example, 
for intellectual property sale of 
collateralized loans)
• Bankruptcy and reorganization 
(for example, when the intellec­
tual property is collateral on a 
secured debt)
• Equity allocation (for example, in 
a corporation, joint venture, part­
nership, or other organization 
structure when one party has con­
tributed intellectual property to 
the organization)
• Litigation and dispute resolution 
(for example, family law, infringe­
ment, and dissipation of corpo­
rate assets)
• C o rp o ra te  governance  and  
strategic planning (for example, 
identification of com m erciali­
zation opportunities)
Transfer price estimate
There are also numerous instances 
when a valuation analyst may be asked 
to estimate an intellectual property 
royalty rate transfer price for third 
party transfer (for example, license) 
purposes. The valuation analyst may 
also inquire of the intellectual prop­
erty owner/operator as to the exis­
tence of recent intellectual property 
royalty rate analyses. Even if such a 
royalty rate analysis did not indicate a 
value, the royalty rate transfer price 
study may still be useful to the valua­
tion analyst performing the valuation. 
Some common intellectual property 
transfer price study purposes include 
the following:
• Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Sec­
tion 482 planning and compliance
S um m er 2 0 0 8 CPA E xpert
related to intercompany transfers 
of intangible property
• License of the intellectual prop­
erty from the owner/developer to 
the third party development or 
commercialization entity
• Private inurement considerations 
(for example, when a not-for- 
profit entity buys, sells, or licenses 
intellectual property to or from a 
for-profit entity)
• Business unit cost accounting (for 
example, when one corporate 
business unit uses an intellectual 
property owned by another cor­
porate business unit)
• Unequal business ownership (for 
example, when a wholly owned 
business licenses in te llec tual 
property to or from a business 
that is not wholly owned)
• Intergenerational transfers (for 
example, when a privately owned 
corporation owned by one gener­
ation licenses an intellectual prop­
erty to or from an entity owned by 
the next generation)
Economic damages
In numerous instances, a valuation 
analyst may be asked to estimate lost 
profits or some other measure of 
economic damages related to the 
intellectual property owner/opera­
tor involved in litigation or a similar 
claim. These lost profits or eco­
nomic damages analyses will likely 
not conclude a value indication for 
the subject intellectual property. 
However, such a lost profits or eco­
nomic damages analysis may pro­
vide useful qualitative and quantita­
tive in te llec tua l p roperty  in fo r­
mation to the valuation analyst who 
is performing the valuation. Some 
of the common litigation related 
purposes for an economic damages 
royalty rate analysis include the fol­
lowing:
• Infringement of the intellectual 
property
• Breach of contract related to the 
intellectual property development 
or exploitation
Exhibit 2. Analytical Weaknesses of the RFR Method in 
Intellectual Property Valuation
1. There are rarely perfect "comparable uncontrolled transactions" (CUT) intellectual property license agreements 
on which the valuation analyst m ay rely.
a. The guideline intellectual property licenses may be in a different industry than the subject owner/operator 
industry.
b. The guideline intellectual property licenses m ay be for a different intellectual property type.
2. It is often difficult to adjust or normalize (or do both) the CUT intellectual property licenses.
a. Often, milestone or other fixed license agreement payments are not publicly disclosed.
b. Often, it is difficult to convert fixed license agreement payments to an intellectual property percentage-type 
royalty rate.
3. The RFR method is not applicable in all instances.
a. Som e types of intellectual property are not typically licensed or are not licensable.
b. The cost approach or the income approach may be more appropriate in some intellectual property valuation 
instances.
4. The RFR method typically produces a downward-biased estimate o f intellectual property value, transfer price, or 
economic damages for the following reasons:
a. Guideline license agreement royalty rates m ay reflect limited intellectual property use rights only.
b. Guideline license agreement royalty rates may reflect value at the intellectual property license agreement 
inception date.
c. Guideline license agreement royalty rates ignore other intellectual property licensee and licensor relation­
ships.
d. Guideline license agreement royalty rates ignore other payments between the intellectual property licensee 
and licensor.
e. Guideline license agreement royalty rates m ay include distressed or dispute settlement transactions, or 
both.
f. Guideline license agreement royalty rates may reflect the subject intellectual property licensee value only 
(but not the subject owner/operator value).
• Breach of a noncompete agree­
m ent involving the intellectual 
property
• Expropriation of the intellectual 
p roperty  by a governm ental 
authority
• Tortious interference with the 
business practices or business 
opportunity
• D efam ation, slander, or libel 
regarding a name-related intellec­
tual property
RFR METHOD VALUATION FORMULA
The basic (or direct capitalization) 
RFR m ethod intellectual property 
valuation formula is as follows:
intellectual property value = owner/operator revenue x  royalty rate discount rate -  growth rate
This direct capitalization valuation 
form ula is appropriate  when the 
intellectual property revenue stream
is a perpetuity, and the annual rate of 
change in the intellectual property 
revenue stream (whether positive or 
negative) is constant. When these 
two simplifying assumptions are not 
appropriate, then the valuation ana­
lyst will modify the direct capitaliza­
tion valuation formula accordingly.
For a limited life owner/operator 
revenue stream or a nonconstant 
revenue growth rate, the valuation 
analyst may have to use a yield capi­
talization valuation formula. Alterna­
tively, the valuation analyst may use 
the direct capitalization model with 
either a limited life present value of 
annuity factor for the discount rate 
or a weighted average of the various 
growth rate  pro jec tions as the 
growth rate.
Regardless of whether the direct 
capitalization formula or the yield 
capitalization formula is used, the
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CPA Expert Sum m er 2 0 0 8
RFR method is based on the use of 
market-derived royalty rates extracted 
from the arm ’s length intellectual 
property licenses. Therefore, the cred­
ibility of the RFR method valuation 
analysis is based on the credibility of 




Exhibit 1 on page 10 summarizes 
the analytical strengths of the RFR 
m ethod of in te llectual property  
valuation. Many of these analytical 
strengths apply directly to an intellec­
tual property valuation performed 
for virtually any purpose.
ANALYTICAL WEAKNESSES OF 
THE RFR METHOD
Exhibit 2 on page 11 summarizes the 
analytical weaknesses of the RFR 
method of intellectual property valua­
tion. Many of these analytical weak­
nesses apply directly to an intellectual 
property valuation performed for vir­
tually any purpose. The valuation ana­
lyst should consider all of these 
methodological strengths and weak­
nesses when using the RFR method in 
any intellectual property valuation. X
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